The Future of Roe v. Wade in the Supreme Court: Devolution of the Right of Abortion and Resurgence of State Control by Allegrucci, Lisa J. & Kunz, Paul E.
Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development 
Volume 7 
Issue 1 Volume 7, Fall 1991, Issue 1 Article 23 
September 1991 
The Future of Roe v. Wade in the Supreme Court: Devolution of the 
Right of Abortion and Resurgence of State Control 
Lisa J. Allegrucci 
Paul E. Kunz 
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred 
Recommended Citation 
Allegrucci, Lisa J. and Kunz, Paul E. (1991) "The Future of Roe v. Wade in the Supreme Court: Devolution 
of the Right of Abortion and Resurgence of State Control," Journal of Civil Rights and Economic 
Development: Vol. 7 : Iss. 1 , Article 23. 
Available at: https://scholarship.law.stjohns.edu/jcred/vol7/iss1/23 
This Note is brought to you for free and open access by the Journals at St. John's Law Scholarship Repository. It 
has been accepted for inclusion in Journal of Civil Rights and Economic Development by an authorized editor of St. 
John's Law Scholarship Repository. For more information, please contact selbyc@stjohns.edu. 
NOTES
THE FUTURE OF ROE v. WADE IN THE
SUPREME COURT: DEVOLUTION OF THE
RIGHT OF ABORTION AND RESURGENCE OF
STATE CONTROL
The legal status of abortion was exclusively within the province
of the state legislatures until 1973,' when the United States Su-
See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 116-18 (1973). The Texas criminal abortion legislation
at issue in Roe v. Wade was "typical of those ... in effect in many States for approximately a
century." Id. at 116. Prior to the codification of abortion law, the majority of states ad-
hered to the pre-existing English common law which permitted abortion before " 'quicken-
ing,' " the first movement of the fetus in the womb, usually appearing between the 16th
and 18th week of pregnancy. Id. at 132, 138 (citing DORLAND'S ILLUSTRATED MEDICAL Dic-
TIONARY 1261 (24th ed. 1965)). In 1821, Connecticut, the first state to enact abortion legis-
lation, criminalized abortion of a quick fetus. Id. at 136, 138 (citing CONN. STAT., tit. 20, §
14 (1821)). In 1828, New York enacted legislation that served as the basis for other early
state anti-abortion statutes by classifying abortion of an unquickened fetus as a misde-
meanor and that of a quick fetus, as second-degree manslaughter while providing an excep-
tion in both circumstances for abortions necessary to preserve the life of the mother. Id. at
138 (citing N.Y. REV. STAT., pt. 4, c. 1, tit. 2, art. 1, § 9 and tit. 6, § 21 (1829)). By the late
19th century, most states had eliminated the quickening distinction from statutory law and
increased the degree of the offense and its penalties. Id. at 139. Increasingly restrictive
abortion statutes culminated in a complete ban of abortion in most states by the end of the
1950's. Id; see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE, ABORTION: THE CLASH OF ABSOLUTES 42 (1990). A
movement to reform strict abortion laws began in 1967 when twenty-eight state legisla-
tures considered liberalization bills, with twelve states passing such bills by 1970. Id. (citing
EVA RUBIN. ABORTION, POLITICS AND THE COURTS 18 (2d ed. 1987)). These reforms were
generally based on a revision of the Model Penal Code by the American Law Institute
(ALl). Id. at 36. The revision to the code added three defenses to a charge of criminal
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preme Court ruled on the constitutionality of laws prohibiting
abortion in the landmark case of Roe v. Wade.2 In Roe, the Court
declared that the fundamental right of privacy' protects a wo-
abortion: 1) the pregnancy would gravely impair the physical or mental health of the
mother; 2) the child was likely to be born with serious physical defects; and 3) the preg-
nancy resulted from rape or incest. Id. The Model Code also required two doctors to cer-
tify the circumstances for the woman's abortion. Id. Although these reforms were intended
to make exceptions on the basis of health, continued inflexibility on the part of the states
and excessive costs kept legal abortions out of reach, especially for indigent women. TRIBE,
supra, at 43. The ineffectiveness of these reforms spurred on a movement for the repeal of
criminal prohibitions of abortion. Id. at 43-49.
For the background and political climate underlying abortion legislation in America, see
generally CELESTE M. CONDIT, DECODING ABORTION RHETORIC 22-58 (1990) (recounting de-
velopment and operation of opposing sides of abortion debate in America against historical
background): NANETTE J. DAVIS, FROM CRIME TO CHOICE (1985) (providing social transfor-
mation of abortion); JAMES C. MOHR, ABORTION IN AMERICA (1978) (characterizing origins,
development and status of abortion in America); ROSALIND P. PETCHESKY, ABORTION AND
WOMAN'S CHotcE 67-138 (rev. ed. 1990) (examining history of abortion in light of state
policies of fertility, population control and sex control); PATRICK J. SHEERAN, WOMEN, SoCI-
ETY, THE STATE AND ABORTION 49-59 (1987) (summarizing history of abortion from pre-
Christian times, focusing on abortion practices and policies in America throughout past
200 years): Joseph W. Dellapenna, The History of Abortion: Technology, Morality, and Law, 40
U. P1-Fr. L. REV. 359, 365-416 (1979) (reviewing Anglo-American history of abortion
against impact of medical technology). For criticism of Roe's reliance on abortion's legal
foundations, see generally William B. Hollberg & Stephen M. Krason, The Law and History
of Abortion: The Supreme Court Refuted, in J. DOUGLAS BUTLER & DAVID F. WALBERT, ABOR-
riON, MEDICINE AND THE LAW 196-210 (3d ed. completely rev. 1986) (asserting Supreme
Court's use of history of abortion as problematic and unfounded); Dennis J. Horan &
Thomas J. Balch, Roe v. Wade: No Justification in History, Law or Logic, in ABORTION AND
THE CONSTITUTION 60-70 (Dennis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987) (accusing Roe majority of
manipulating early civil law and conflicting common law of abortion to circumvent its his-
torical disfavor).
2 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
Id. at 152-55. The Supreme Court grounded the fundamental right of abortion in the
right of privacy. Id. at 153. The Court stated that although the Constitution does not ex-
plicitly mention any right of privacy, a guarantee of certain areas or zones of privacy does
exist. Id. at 152. In varying contexts, the right of privacy has been found to stem from the
First, Fourth, Fifth and Ninth Amendments, the penumbras of the Bill of Rights and from
the liberty guarantee of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. (citations omitted). As the right of
privacy expanded to marital activities, procreation, contraception, family relationships,
child rearing and education, so too was this right "broad enough to encompass a woman's
decision whether or not to terminate her pregnancy." Id. at 152-53 (citations omitted).
The Court predicated its decision on the "detriment that the State would impose upon the
pregnant woman by denying this choice altogether." Id. at 153.
This guarantee of personal privacy has been characterized as a fundamental right which
can be abridged only when there is a " 'compelling state interest.' " Id. at 152, 155 (cita-
tions omitted). Maternal health, prenatal life and medical standards are values which may
rise to the level of compelling state interest as the need to protect and preserve them in-
creases. Id. at 155.
The majority's extension of a right of privacy to a woman's decision to terminate her
pregnancy brought similar dissents from Justices Rehnquist and White. Id. at 167, 171-78
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting), 221-23 (White, J., dissenting). Both Justices argued that the
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man's right to choose whether to terminate her pregnancy within
a trimester framework." The shockwaves emanating from this de-
cision have stirred up powerful emotional and political opinions.5
right to choose was not fundamental, but merely a form of liberty, not to be withheld
without due process of law as guaranteed by the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 172-73
(Rehnquist, J., dissenting). Thus, permissive or restrictive abortion legislation could be en-
acted by the states as long as it bore "a rational relation to a valid state objective." Id. at
173 (citing Williamson v. Lee Optical Co., 348 U.S. 483, 491 (1955)). See generally LYNN D.
WARDLE. THE ABORTION PRIVACY DOCTRINE 3-18 (1981) (analyzing and criticizing Roe v.
Wade for its basis on right of privacy); William Van Alstyne, Closing the Circle of Constitu-
tional Review from Griswold v. Connecticut to Roe v. Wade: An Outline of a Decision Merely
Overruling Roe, 1989 DUKE L.J. 1677, 1678-83 (asserting great disparity between right of
privacy to contraception in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965) and Roe's right of
privacy to "destroy third-party life in gestation"); John Hart Ely, The Wages of Crying Wolf.
A Comment on Roe v. Wade, 82 YALE L.J. 920, 935-36 (1972-73) (characterizing freedom to
choose abortion as mere liberty interest to be accorded Fourteenth Amendment due pro-
cess of law and calling "super-protected" right in Roe "frightening"). But see generally HY-
MAN RODMAN & BETTY SARVIS, THE ABORTION CONTROVERSY 57-59, 64-66 (1974) (confirm-
ing right of privacy in Roe); Alan Freeman & Elizabeth Mensh, The Politics of Virtue:
Animals, Theology and Abortion, 25 GA. L. REV. 923, 1103 n.681 (1991) (acknowledging Roe's
right of privacy rationale as derived from Griswold).
4 See 410 U.S. at 164. During the first trimester of pregnancy, i.e., the first twelve weeks,
the state may not interfere with a woman's decision to terminate her pregnancy because
such decision is left to the woman in consultation with her physician. Id. For the second
trimester, the state may, if it chooses, regulate the abortion procedure in ways reasonably
related to maternal health. Id. Upon viability, i.e., the point at which the baby is able to
maintain an independent existence or to live after birth outside the womb, see DORLAND'S
POCKET MEDICAL DICTIONARY 721 (22d ed. 1977), which occurs during the final trimester,
the state has an interest in the potentiality of human life and may, if it chooses, regulate or
even proscribe abortion except when necessary to save the life of the mother. 410 U.S. at
164-65. Thus, a state criminal abortion statute, allowing abortion only in cases to save the
life of the mother, is violative of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id. at 164.
' See National Org. for Women (NOW) v. Operation Rescue, 726 F. Supp. 1483 (E.D.
Va. 1989), affid, 914 F.2d 582 (4th Cir. 1990), cert. granted sub nom. Bray v. Alexandria
Women's Health Clinic, 111 S. Ct. 1070 (1991). This suit was initiated by abortion clinics
and abortion rights organizations that sought to permanently enjoin the anti-abortion or-
ganization, Operation Rescue, from, inter alia, trespassing on, sitting in, blocking, imped-
ing or obstructing ingress into, or egress from, any facility offering abortion services and
related medical and psychological counseling in the Washington D.C. metropolitan area.
NOW, 726 F. Supp. at 1486-87, 1489. The case is representative of nationwide "rescue"
demonstrations intended to prevent access to abortion clinics by pregnant women. Id. at
1490 nn.5-10 (citing federal cases in which such demonstrations were enjoined). The de-
fendants and their activist followers seek to prevent abortions, to discourage women from
seeking abortion services and to convey the "moral righteousness and intensity of their
anti-abortion views." Id. at 1488. The demonstrations were held to be violations of 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3), viz. a conspiracy to interfere with women's right to interstate travel and
conspiracy to interfere with privacy rights, as well as state violations of trespass and nui-
sance. Id. at 1492-95; NOW, 914 F.2d at 586. Although the First Amendment did not give
license to engage in unlawful conduct or to impede access to clinics, activities that intimi-
dated, harassed or disturbed clinic patients were protected by the free speech guarantee,
provided they did not infringe on a person's right of access to an abortion clinic. NOW, 726
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In the years following Roe, the Supreme Court has shielded the
right of abortion from attack by state legislatures,6 pro-life constit-
uents, 7 and growing internal dissent.8  A number of decisions,
F. Supp. at 1497. The Supreme Court heard oral arguments for the Bray case on October
16, 1991. Ruth Marcus, Use of KKK Law Against Anti-abortion Protestors Argued Before Court,
WASH POST, Oct. 17, 1991, at A 1.
Anti-abortion demonstrations have been notably vivid in the history and development of
abortion law. See Dinah R. PoKempner, Note, The Scope of Noerr Immunity for Direct Action
Protestors: Antitrust Meets the Anti-Abortionists, Note, 9 COLUM. L. REV. 662, 662-63 (1989)
(portraying anti-abortion demonstrations as militant, noisy and sometimes violent and dis-
cussing possible antitrust immunity for these "political" demonstrators); James G. Pope,
Republican Moments: The Role of Direct Popular Power in the American Constitutional Order,
139 U. PA. L. REV. 287, 315 (1990) (characterizing abortion demonstrations as intensely
passionate, moral and consequently political); Dudley Clendinen, U.S. Sends Warning of Po-
tential Threat to Abortion Clinics, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 1985, at Al (reporting warning issued
by federal government to abortion clinics to protect against potential bombing and arson
on twelfth anniversary of Roe v. Wade); Joseph B. Cumming, Jr., Right-To-Life-Two Crusad-
ers, NEWSWEEK, Mar. 3, 1975, at 29 (describing graphic and emotional slide lecture series
presented nationwide by anti-abortion missionaries); Juan Williams, 10 Held in Protest at
Abortion Clinic, WASH. POST, Dec. 3, 1978, at B5 (reporting arrest of protestors who entered
medical procedures area of clinic chanting, praying and crying).
' See Mark E. Chopko & Helen Alvare, Legal Issues in a Post-Webster World, 34, No. I
CATH LAW, 115, 116 (1991). In the years following Roe v. Wade, "the Supreme Court fur-
ther extended and reinforced .. .decisional freedom and eliminated all meaningful regula-
tion of abortion through rejection of every challenge presented, save funding restrictions
and limited parental interests." Id. (citations omitted); TRIBE, supra note 1, at 15 (noting
that anti-abortion legislatures attempted to undermine Roe with provisions just slightly less
restrictive than those pre-Roe); Christopher A. Crain, Note, Judicial Restraint and the Non-
Decision in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 13 HARV. J: L & PUB. POL'y 263, 263
(1990). Since its decision in Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court rather than the states has
primarily controlled regulation of abortion through Roe and its "progeny." Id.; see, e.g.,
Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 759
(1986) (invalidating detailed fetal development and similar informed consent information
as methods "to intimidate women into continuing pregnancies"); Planned Parenthood
Ass'n of Kansas City, Mo. v. Ashcroft, 462 U.S. 476, 482 (1983) (holding mandatory hospi-
talization for second trimester abortions unconstitutional); City of Akron v. Akron Ctr. for
Reprod. Health, 462 U.S 416, 427 n.10 (1983) (allowing parental consent of minor child's
decision to abort when judicial bypass is alternative form of approval); Belloti v. Baird, 443
U.S. 622, 639, 648 (1979) (requiring that parental consent have quick and confidential
judicial bypass alternative); Colautti v. Franklin, 439 U.S. 379, 391-92 (1979) (invalidating
viability provision requiring doctors to refuse to abort viable fetus or to provide for its live
birth): Planned Parenthood v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-74 (1976) (disallowing spousal
veto, spousal consent in first trimester, and absolute parental veto).
See WARREN FREEDMAN, LEGAL ISSUES IN BIOTECHNOLOGY AND HUMAN REPRODUCTION
123-24 (1991) (stating that anti-abortion forces waged war against right to abortion imme-
diately after Roe v. Wade); RODMAN & SARVIS, supra note 3, at 66 (pointing to rejection of
legal abortion by Catholic hierarchy); Lawrence M. Friedman, The Conflict Over Constitu-
tional Legitimacy, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYSTEM 13, 23 (1983) (ac-
knowledging great controversial response to Roe). But see CONDIT, supra note 1, at 147-49
(public opinion polls indicate little change in abortion beliefs).
s See TRIBE, supra note 1, at 14-21 (making note of Supreme Court's reaffirmation of Roe
v. Wade despite "a gradually growing number of dissents" and increasingly conservative
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however, have demonstrated the Court's increased willingness to
allow legislators to restrict a woman's right of abortion, thereby
limiting the application of Roe.'
This Note will discuss developments in the law following Roe v.
Wade which abridge the right of abortion. Part One will analyze
Supreme Court decisions regarding state and federal abortion
funding, including the most recent case which conditioned federal
funds on the restriction of free speech in family planning clinics
nationwide. Part Two will address the Court's leniency toward
state restrictions on abortion and will review current state abor-
tion laws which pose challenges to Roe. Finally, Part Three will
examine the theories of judicial decision-making regarding abor-
court); Thomas J. Marzen & Victor G. Rosenblum, Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade
Through the Courts, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 195, 195-97 (1987) (discrediting
legal theory of Roe with Supreme Court faction and postulating strategy for its reversal);
Chopko & Alvare, supra note 6, at 116 n.10. The authors typify the Supreme Court as
sharply and irrevocably divided on abortion as evidenced by a pattern of diminishing ma-
jorities, i.e., from seven-to-two in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973), to six-to-three in
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416 (1983), to five-to-four in Thorn-
burgh, 476 U.S. 747. Id.; see also Lynne Henderson, Authoritarianism and the Rule of Law, 66
IND. L.J. 379, 379 (1991). In noting a "dramatic shift in constitutional adjudication" by the
Supreme Court in areas of abortion, affirmative action, civil rights, capital punishment and
the like, the author credits the shift to authoritarianism, and not to conservatism. Id. Con-
servatism implies "a sense of caution or a respect for tradition that is not absolute or inflex-
ible." Id. Authoritarianism "represents inflexibility and oppression." Id. at 379-80. It in-
sists on obedience and conformity and will utilize coercion and punishment to ensure that
obedience. Id. at 382. It is a threat to "human freedom and dignity." Id. at 379; see Marcia
Coyle, The New Term, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 7, 1991, at I (anticipating unpredictability of "rap-
idly changing" Supreme Court on constitutional issues); David G. Savage, The Rehnquist
Court; Bill Rehnquist was Once an Extremist. Now His Views Almost Always Become the Law of the
Land, L.A. TIMES, Sept. 29, 1991, at 12 (depicting Chief Justice Rehnquist as unflinchingly
conservative with control of Court and commitment to rewriting constitutional law).
' See, e.g., Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (upholding use of federal funds
for range of family planning services except abortion counseling); Hodgson v. Minnesota,
110 S. Ct. 2926, 2944 (1990) (allowing 48-hour waiting period between notification of mi-
nor's parents and performance of abortion); Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492
U.S. 490, 521 (1989) (upholding significantly restrictive state regulation of abortion); H.L.
v. Matheson, 450 U.S. 398, 413 (1981) (requiring physician to notify parents of minor
dependant with no showing of maturity or emancipation); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297,
325 (1980) (permitting state governmental regulations withholding Medicaid funds for cer-
tain medically necessary abortions); Poelker v. Doe, 432 U.S. 519, 521 (1977) (allowing
publicly'financed hospital services for childbirth without similar services for abortions not
necessary to save woman's life); Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 478-80 (1977) (upholding
welfare regulations that fund childbirth but not abortions unless physician determines
abortion to be medically necessary). See generally Vivian Berger, Civil Liberties in the Next
Century, 63 N.Y. ST. BJ. 46 (1991) (referring to routine rejection of civil liberties cases by
Supreme Court majority).
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tion and will argue that the Court is not adhering to Roe v. Wade
but is implicitly overruling it, in order to return the abortion issue
to the states.
I. THE ABORTION FUNDING ARENA
A. The State Approach: Promoting Childbirth
The Supreme Court has given both Congress and the state leg-
islatures substantial discretion in advancing alternatives to abor-
tion.1" In Maher v. Roe," two indigent women challenged the va-
lidity of a Connecticut welfare regulation which granted Medicaid
benefits only for the performance of "medically necessary" abor-
tions." The Court concluded that a state could refuse to pay for
nontherapeutic abortions for indigent women, even though its
Medicaid program reimbursed women for expenses associated
with childbirth. In addressing what Roe v. Wade defined as a fun-
damental right of abortion, the majority determined that the state
could promote childbirth as a more attractive alternative to abor-
tion through the use of state funding. 4 The Court emphasized
that this decision was not a retreat from Roe, since the regulation
placed no obstacle, "absolute or otherwise," in an indigent wo-
man's path toward obtaining an abortion. 5
Three years later, the Supreme Court applied the Maher fund-
ing rationale in Harris v. McRae. 6 In Harris, a group of indigent
10 See, e.g., Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778 (upholding use of federal funds for full range of
family planning services while prohibiting funds for abortion); Harris, 448 U.S. at 325 (al-
lowing state to withhold funding for certain medically necessary abortions); Maher, 432
U.S. at 478-80 (1977) (permitting state to refuse to fund nontherapeutic abortions). See
generally Theodore C. Hirt, Why the Government is not Required to Subsidize Abortion Counsel-
ing and Referral, 101 HARV. L. REv. 1895, 1898-1901 (1988) (supporting Supreme Court's
decisions to allow governmental nonfunding of abortions).
"I 432 U.S. 464 (1977).
12 Id. at 466-67.
11 Id. at 474.
14 Id.
15 Id.; see Laura C. Sloan, Comment, Constitutional Law-State Impediments to Abortion
Funding-National Educ. Ass'n of R.I. v. Garrahy, 34 KAN. L. REV- 387 (1985). "[T~he
Court distinguished between the state's creation of an obstacle to abortion and the state's
refusal to remove an existing obstacle. The former is an impermissible burden on a wo-
man's right of privacy, while the latter is constitutionally permissible." Id. at 387.
10 448 U.S. 297 (1980); see Catherine Hebert, Prohibition of Public Funding for Abortion
Counseling: Government Violation of Women's Constitutional Right of Privacy, 17 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 421, 432 (1990) (stating court followed reasoning of Maher).
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women challenged the Hyde Amendment to the Medicaid pro-
gram, which allowed states to withhold funds for certain medically
necessary abortions, because federal reimbursement was not avail-
able for such procedures." The Secretary of Health, Education
and Welfare, charged with overseeing the Medicaid program, as-
serted that the denial of funding supported the state's interest in
protecting the health of the mother,"9 as recognized in Roe.'9 Re-
lying on Maher, the Court concluded that the only obstacle re-
stricting a pregnant woman's right to exercise her freedom of
choice was indigency, and that the state had no duty to remove
that obstacle.2" Thus, the foregoing indicates that Maher and Har-
ris have affirmed the states' definitive right to fund programs
favoring childbirth over abortion, with the practical result of bar-
ring indigent women from exercising their right to choose
abortion."2
17 Harris, 448 U.S. at 297. The Hyde Amendment was a congressional restriction on the
use of federal Medicaid funds to reimburse the cost of abortions, except in situations where
the life of the mother was threatened or the pregnancy resulted from rape or incest which
had been reported promptly to a law enforcement or public health agency. Id.
18 Id. at 313.
"I Id.; see supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (illustrating how fundamental protec-
tion and trimester framework set forth in Roe restricted scope of state regulations to those
concerning maternal health).
"0 Harris, 448 U.S. at 316. "[F]inancial constraints that restrict an indigent woman's ...
freedom of choice are the product not of governmental restrictions on access to abortions,
but rather of indigency." Id.
"' See Hirt, supra note 10, at 1899 (stating that Maher and Harris will lead to fewer abor-
tions). There are predictions of a more securely entrenched "two-tiered health-care system:
one that provides affluent women with the full range of options and offers poor women
either skewed information or a range of services severely constrained by funding limita-
tions." Id. at 1899; see also Clinics Vow to Forgo Funds, Keep Abortion Counseling, BOSTON
GLOBE, June 24, 1991, National/Foreign, at I [hereinafter Clinics Vow]. The Alan
Guttmacher Institute conducted a study of Title X patients and reported that 3.7 million
women a year use federally funded family planning clinics. Of these:
83 percent use them as their only source of pregnancy planning
29 percent are under twenty years old
27 percent are black and 11 percent Hispanic
31 percent have incomes below the federal poverty level
16 percent have diabetes, hypertension or other health problems that make preg-
nancy dangerous
Without the subsidized clinics, there would be an extra 509,000 unintended births
a year and 516,000 abortions.
Id. at 6; Jane Smolowe, Gagging the Clinics: The Justices Did Not Disturb the Constitutional
Right to an Abortion but Made It Illegal to Discuss the Procedure in Federally Funded Clinics,
TIME, June 3, 1991, at 16. Dr. Allan Rosenfield, dean of Columbia University School of
Public Health and professor of public health and obstetrics, said that Rust could lead to
Journal of Legal Commentary Vol. 7: 295, 1991
Roe v. Wade and its progeny constructed a fundamental right of
abortion22 and confined state regulation to matters of maternal
health, prenatal life, and medical standards.23 The Supreme Court
in Maher and Harris placed additional limitations on that right by
allowing states to exercise considerable power in curtailing the
availability of abortions through the allocation of funds.24 Thus,
in balancing the competing values of the individual's right of
abortion with the states' interests, it is suggested that the Court
has endowed the states with a regulatory power which effectively
diminishes that fundamental right. It is further submitted that the
state funding cases of Maher and Harris sanctioned the condition-
ing of federal funds on the prohibition of abortion-related ser-
vices in clinics nationwide.
"limited services and more abortions and high-risk pregnancies due to more difficulty get-
ting access to prenatal care." Some Clinics Plan to Advise and Forgo Aid, N.Y. TIMEs, May 24,
1991, at A5 [hereinafter Some Clinics].
22 See Rust v. Sullivan, 11l S. Ct. 1759, 1778 (1991) (Blackmun, j., dissenting) (stating
that Roe and its progeny concern fundamental right to self-determination); Crain, supra
note 6, at 263 and accompanying cases (discussing Roe and its progeny); Andrea M. Shar-
rin, Note, Potential Fathers and Abortion: A Woman's Womb Is Not a Man's Castle, 55 BROOK.
L. REV. 1359, 1359 (1990). "The Supreme Court has reaffirmed that Roe and its progeny
clearly establish that an adult woman has an untrammeled constitutional right to choose an
abortion in the first trimester." Id.; see also Harris, 448 U.S. at 329-30 (Brennan, J., dissent-
ing) (reaffirming that Roe and its progeny established women's freedom from state interfer-
ence with her reproductive choice); Paul S. Grobman, Comment, The Constitutionality of
Statutorily Restricting Public Access to Judicial Proceedings: The Case of the Rape Shield
Mandatory Closure Provision, 66 B.U. L. REV. 271, 303 (1986) (asserting that Roe and its
progeny represent freedom from governmental interference with respect to this private
and individual decision); cf Stephen E. Gottlieb, Compelling Governmental Interests: An Essen-
tial But Analyzed Term in Constitutional Adjudication, 68 B.U. L. REV. 917, 949 (1988) (noting
compelling state interest in protecting potential life in final months of pregnancy as estab-
lished by Roe and its progeny).
22 See Roe, 410 U.S. at 155, 164-65 (stating that these maternal health, prenatal life and
medical standards are values which state has great interest in safeguarding and are calcu-
lated into trimester schedule of pregnancy); Thornburgh, 476 U.S. at 797 (Stevens, J., con-
curring). Justice Stevens noted that Roe and its progeny created a national right of abortion
because "the legitimate goals that may be served by state coercion of private choices re-
garding abortion are, at least under some circumstances, outweighed by the damage to
individual autonomy and privacy that such coercion entails." Id. But see Planned Par-
enthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 688 (3d Cir. 1991). "Justice
O'Connor has referred to abortion as a 'limited' fundamental right." Id. (citing Akron v.
Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S. 416, 453 (1983) (O'Connor, J., dissenting)).
2 See Hirt, supra note 10, at 1900 (postulating that decisions in Maher and Harris should
insulate government abortion funding activities from extensive judicial review).
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B. The Federal Philosophy: Rust v. Sullivan and the Gag Rule
Recently, in Rust v. Sullivan,2" the Supreme Court allowed the
federal government to further restrict a woman's right of abor-
tion26 through its formidable spending power.7
In 1970, Congress enacted Title X of the Public Health Service
Act which provided federal funding to clinics offering a broad
range of family planning services.2 1 Section 1008 of the Act speci-
fied that Title X funds were not to be used in clinics where abor-
tion was offered as a method of family planning.29 After Roe v.
Wade, Title X providers had been permitted to provide their pa-
tients with nondirective counseling and referral for abortions."0
However, in 1988, the Secretary of the Department of Health and
Human Services ("HHS") promulgated new regulations that un-
equivocally prohibited Title X clinics from engaging in abortion
counseling, referral, or advocacy.
3 1
25 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991).
2 See Statutory Prohibition on the Use of Appropriated Funds Where Abortion is a
Method of Family Planning, 53 Fed. Reg. 2922-46 (1988) (codified at 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.1-
215).
27 See BUDGET OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT, Fiscal Year 1990, Table 24, at 10-45 (1989)
(federal expenditures for fiscal year 1990 were approximately $1.152 billion); Steven V.
Roberts, U.S. Proposes Curb on Clinics Giving Abortion Advice, N.Y. TIMES, July 31, 1987, at
Al (quoting $142.5 million for family planning services, fiscal year 1988).
28 See Family Planning Services and Population Research Act of 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-
572, 84 Stat. 1504 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 300 - 300a-6 (1988)).
2" See supra note 26 (setting forth regulation which denies federal funds for abortion
counseling or services).
30 See Program Guidelines for Project Grants for Family Planning Services, Public Health
Service of HHS, 1981, at 12-13 (requiring Title X projects to provide information on all
options of family planning).
" See Grants for Family Planning Services, 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.7-.10 (1988). The most rele-
vant regulations state in pertinent part that:
59.8(a)(1) A Title X project may not provide counseling concerning the use of abor-
tion as a method of family planning or provide referral for abortion as a method of
family planning.
59.8(a)(2) Because Title X funds are intended only for family planning, once a client
served by a Title X project is diagnosed as pregnant, she must be referred for appro-
priate prenatal and/or social services by furnishing a list of available providers that
promote the welfare of the mother and unborn child. She must also be provided
with information necessary to protect the health of the mother and unborn child
until such time as the referral appointment is kept ....
59.8(a)(3) A Title X project may not use prenatal, social service or emergency medi-
cal or other referrals as an indirect means of encouraging or promoting abortion as
a method of family planning, such as by weighing the list of referrals in favor of
health care providers which perform abortions, by including on the list of referral
providers health care providers whose principal business is the provision of abor-
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Before the new regulations were applied, Title X health care
providers brought suit against the Secretary of HHS on behalf of
themselves and their patients.3 2 The suit alleged that the regula-
tions were not authorized by Title X 3 and that they violated the
First and Fifth Amendments. 3 The federal district court rejected
tions, by excluding available providers who do not provide abortions, or by "steer-
ing" clients to providers who offer abortion as a method of family planning.
59.10(a) A Title X project may not encourage, promote or advocate abortion as a
method of family planning. This requirement prohibits actions to assist women to
obtain abortions or increase the availability or accessibility of abortion for family
planning purposes. Prohibited actions include the use of Title X project funds for
the following:
(5) Developing or disseminating in any way materials (including printed matter
and audiovisual materials) advocating abortion as a method of family planning.
Id.
32 See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1759 (1991).
" See id. at 1766; 42 C.F.R. §§ 59.7-.10 (1990); Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v.
Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1496 (10th Cir. 1990) (noting that administrative interpretation
has been consistent since enactment of Title X), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); Massachu-
setts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 56 (1st Cir. 1990) (acknowl-
edging new regulations significantly alter previous agency interpretation), vacated, 111 S.
Ct. 2252 (1991); 120 CONG. REC. 21,687-21,695 (1974) (striking down amendment that
would have barred funds for abortion referral); 121 CONG REC. 20,863-65 (1975) (voting
against amendment restricting promotion of abortion); 124 CONG. REC. 37,045 (1978) (re-
jecting amendment identical to 1988 regulations); Letter from Carol C. Conrad, Office of
the General Counsel, U.S. Dept. of Health, Education, and Welfare, to Elsie Sullivan, As-
sistant for Information and Education, Office for Family Planning, Bureau of Community
Health Serv. (Apr. 14, 1978) (stating current nondirective policy of referral or information
concerning abortion services is not considered to be proscribed by Title X); cf Bob Jones
Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 599-601 (1983) (indicating that congressional inac-
tion regarding highly debated social issues depicts acceptance of existing administrative
interpretations); Merrill Lynch Pierce Fenner & Smith v. Curran, 456 U.S. 353, 402 (1982)
(Powell, J., dissenting) ("legislative inaction should achieve the force of law"); C. Andrew
McCarthy, Comment, The Prohibition on Abortion Counseling and Referral in Federally-Funded
Family Planning Clinics, 77 CALIF. L. REV. 1181, 1184 (1989) (asserting that 1970 Title X
amendment was an interpretation to which Congress apparently acquiesced). See generally
State v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 418 (2d Cir. 1989) (Kearse, J., dissenting) (recounting how
Secretary admitted 1988 regulations were result of shift in political climate), affid, Rust v.
Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759 (1991); Reagan Vows "Our Best" to Abortion Foes, LA. TIMES, Jan.
22, 1988, § 1, at 1 (showing introduction of new regulations in politically charged presi-
dential speech asking for pro-life support).
" Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1766; see U.S. CONST. amend 1. The First Amendment provides in
pertinent part: "Congress shall make no law . . . abridging the freedom of speech.
Id.; U.S. CONST. amend V. The Fifth Amendment provides in pertinent part that "[n]o
person shall . . . be deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of law.
Id. Challenges have been made under the Fourteenth Amendment as well. See Williams v.
Zbarez, 448 U.S. 358 (1980). This case brought a Fourteenth Amendment challenge
against a state program that only paid for abortions which were necessary to save the life of
the mother. Id. at 361. Petitioners claimed that public funding of medically necessary ser-
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the petitioners' claims and granted summary judgment in favor of
the Secretary. 5 Although the Second Circuit upheld the regula-
tions,36 a split developed among the circuit courts when the First
and Tenth Circuits invalidated the regulations.3 The Supreme
Court granted certiorari to resolve this issue.3 8
Affirming the Second Circuit's holding, the Court determined
that the regulations were within the constructive scope of the Sec-
retary's authority39 and that their implementation would not pre-
vent women from exercising their abortion right."' The majority
found that both the legislative history and the language of Title X
vices, but not medically necessary abortions, were a violation of the Equal Protection
Clause. Id. The Court, however, held that such funding programs did not violate the Four-
teenth Amendment. Id. at 369; D R v. Mitchell, 645 F.2d 852, 853 (10th Cir. 1981) (hold-
ing that Utah statute denying funds for abortion unless necessary to save mother's life does
not violate Fourteenth Amendment); cf. Ruth Colker, Feminism, Theology and Abortion: To-
ward Love, Compassion and Wisdom, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1011, 1046 (1989) (criticizing unwilling-
ness to provide public funding for abortions for indigent women even when pregnancy
substantially threatens health or well being).
11 See State v. Bowen, 690 F. Supp. 1261, 1265 (S.D.N.Y. 1988), affid, 889 F.2d 401 (2d
Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). The district court deci-
sion was based solely on the premise that "[tihe regulations do not prohibit or compel
speech. They grant money to support one view and not another; but that is quite different
from infringing on free speech." Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1274. The court incorrectly used
FCC v. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364 (1984) as precedent. Bowen, 690 F. Supp.
at 1273. The Bowen court wrote that "neither Congress nor any agency is entirely 'without
power to regulate' content, timing and character of speech." Id. The court's reliance on
League of Women Voters was misleading because in that case a provision of the Public Broad-
casting Act of 1967 was struck down for prohibiting stations that receive federal funds
from editorializing. League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 400-01. The Bowen court attempted
to avoid the outcome of League of Women Voters by trivializing First Amendment protection
of the right to receive abortion information in comparison with "important journalistic
freedoms." Bowen, 690 F. Supp. at 1273-74.
3 See State v. Sullivan, 889 F.2d 401, 407-10 (2d Cir. 1989), affd sub nom. Rust v. Sulli-
van, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). The Sullivan court relied on the case of Chevron, U.S.A., Inc.
v. Nat. Resources Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842-44 (1984) to decide the statutory
construction issue. Sullivan, 889 F.2d at 409. The Court in Chevron stated that when a
statute is ambiguous the agency's construction must be accorded substantial deference as
the interpretation of the agency charged with administering the statute, and may not be
disturbed as an abuse of discretion if it reflects a plausible construction of the statute's
plain language and does not otherwise conflict with Congress' expressed intent. Chevron,
467 U.S. at 844.
1 See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human and Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 71 (1st
Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated, Ill S. Ct. 2252 (1991) (striking down program integrity pro-
vision of 1988 regulations as violative of congressional intent); Planned Parenthood Fed'n
of America v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1495 (10th Cir. 1990) (relying on First Circuit),
vacated, Ill S. Ct. 2252 (1991).
38 See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1764 (1991).
I d. at 1767-69.
40 Id. at 1776-78.
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were ambiguous,41 and the Secretary's interpretation was a per-
missible construction of the plain language of the statute."2 Ad-
dressing the constitutional issues, the Court stated that the free
speech rights of Title X health care providers had not been
abridged43 because the providers were free to engage in abortion-
related speech outside of the federally funded program.44 In addi-
tion, the majority held that the regulations did not violate a wo-
man's Fifth Amendment right to choose whether to terminate her
pregnancy,45 reiterating the well-established rule that the govern-
ment has no duty to fund every constitutionally protected activity
and can choose to favor one activity to the exclusion of others."'
Writing for the dissent, Justice Blackmun, who authored Roe v.
Wade, asserted that the majority opinion had sidestepped several
major issues.47 He argued that the decision allowed the govern-
41 Id. at 1767-68. "[W]e agree with every court to have addressed the issue that the
language is ambiguous ..... [T~he question for the court is whether the agency's answer is
based on a permissible construction of the statute.' " Id. at 1767 (quoting Chevron v. Nat.
Resources Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837, 842-43 (1984)). The Court also found the legislative
history to be ambiguous since Congress had never directly addressed the issue of abortion
counseling. Id.
42 See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1769. The Court held that when the legislative history and
language of a statute are unclear, it is customary to defer to agency interpretation. Id. at
1769: cf Planned Parenthood Fed'n of Am. v. Sullivan, 913 F.2d 1492, 1497 (10th Cir.
1990) (granting deference to agency's interpretation although regulations were inconsis-
tent with congressional intent), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991); Massachusetts v. Secretary
of HHS, 899 F.2d 53, 58 (1st Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991) (giving
deference to regulations despite concerns of shifting 17 year-old policy).
"' See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776. The Court asserts that the regulations do not force a
doctor "to represent as his own any opinion that he does not in fact hold." Id. Since the
program does not provide medical care after conception, "a doctor's silence with regard to
abortion cannot reasonably be thought to mislead a client into thinking that the doctor
does not consider abortion an appropriate option for her." Id. Contra Sullivan, 913 F.2d at
1503 (placing limitation on physicians' communication violates their constitutional rights);
Secretary of HHS, 899 F.2d at 73 (Court held that regulations infringe upon protections
found in First Amendment); see also Carole I. Chervin, Note, The Title X Family Planning
Gag Rule: Can the Government Buy Up Constitutional Rights?, 41 STAN. L. REV. 401, 410-22
(1989) (surveying recent decisions in which gag rule would be found unconstitutional).
Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1775.
Id. at 1777 (quoting Harris v. McRae, 488 U.S. 297, 317 (1980)).
Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1776 (quoting DeShaney v. Winnebago County Dept. of Social
Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196 (1989)); see Youngberg v. Romeo, 457 U.S. 307, 317 (1982).
"[A] State is under no constitutional duty to provide substantive services for those within
its border." Id.; McRae, 448 U.S. at 317-18 (asserting that states have no obligation to fund
abortions); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S 56, 74 (1972) (expressing that state has no consti-
tutional dvity to provide housing).
" See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1778-79 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun
questioned how content-based restrictions on speech, imposed by regulations in a congres-
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ment to enforce an unconstitutional condition48 of silence upon
Title X providers, while surreptitiously limiting the right of abor-
tion for indigent women by coercing them to follow through with
childbirth. 9 Justice Blackmun concluded that the majority "[i]n
its haste further to restrict the right of every woman to control
her reproductive freedom . . . disregards established principles of
law and contorts this Court's decided cases to arrive at its pre-
ordained result.
50
1. Conditions on Funding: Penalizing Abortion by Restricting
Free Speech
In Maher v. Roe, the Supreme Court allowed states to favor
childbirth through the allocation of funds.' The states, however,
were not permitted to advance their interest in promoting child-
sional act could not implicate core constitutional questions. Id.
" Id. at 1782; see Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 597 (1972), overruled by Rust v.
Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991). Justice Stewart stated that no persons have rights to valu-
able government benefits, thus benefits may be denied for numerous reasons. Id. However,
the government may not deny a benefit on the "basis that [it] infringes [upon a] constitu-
tionally protected interest-especially . . . freedom of speech." Id.; Pickering v. Bd. of
Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968) (holding employment in public school system may not be
conditioned upon suspension of teacher's First Amendment rights); Keyishian v. Bd. of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 604 (1967) (conditioning teaching position on non-Communist ac-
tivity is unconstitutional); see also Edward G. Reitler, The Title X Family Planning Subsidies:
Government's Role in Moral Issues, 27 HARV. J. ON LEGIs. 453, 464 (1990) (discussing uncon-
stitutional conditions doctrine and Sindermann decision); David M. Schoeggl, New Life for
the Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions?, 58 WASH. L. REV. 679, 682-84 (1983). At the
inception of the unconstitutional conditions theory, "rights" protected by the Constitution
and "privileges" dictated by the legislature were distinguished. Id. It was asserted that
rights could never be conditioned, whereas privileges could be conditioned, because the
recipient had only to refuse the funds to retain his rights. Id.
" See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun observed that
the indigent women whom Title X serves would follow the "perceived advice" of their
physicians, not knowing the physicians' speech was strictly controlled by government regu-
lations. Id. Moreover, the vast majority of these women, relying on this advice, would
"carry their pregnancy to term, despite their needs to the contrary and despite the safety
of the abortion procedure. ... Id.
"0 Id. at 1786; see Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 546 (1989)
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun first charged the plurality with masquerading
their reasoning, stating their intent was quite clearly "not to persuade, but to prevail." Id.
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Christopher C. Kendall, Comment, New York v.
Sullivan: SHHH. . . . Don't Say the "A" Word!Another Outcome Oriented Abortion Decision, 23
J, MARSHALL L. REV. 753, 758-64 (1990) (dissecting subjective reasoning of lower court
which Supreme Court later followed).
"' See Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1973); see also supra notes 11-15 and accompa-
nying text (discussing Maher funding rationale).
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birth over a woman's right to abortion through the restriction of
free speech.52 It is submitted that the 1988 regulations inhibit the
free speech of Title X providers and patients by imposing uncon-
stitutional conditions upon the receipt of federal funds.53
Conditional federal funding requires both content and view-
point neutrality with respect to the speech involved.54 Until Rust,
the Supreme Court had never upheld the conditioning of public
funds on the suppression of viewpoint-based speech. 55 Suppression
of speech based on content or viewpoint is the purest example of
a "law . ..abridging the freedom of speech . . . ." The Rust
decision allows the federal government to restrict free speech be-
cause of its abortion viewpoint. 57 It is submitted that the prohibi-
tion of encouraging, promoting or advocating abortion as a
62 See, e.g., Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 (1989) (holding that statute cannot pro-
hibit flag burning because society finds it disagreeable); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc. v.
Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 233 (1987) (holding statute unconstitutional which taxed
magazines based on content), overruled by Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991); FCC v.
League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. 364, 402 (1984) (striking down ban on editorializing
by publicly funded radio stations), overruled by Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991);
Police Dept. of Chicago v. Mosley, 408 U.S. 92, 95 (1972) (stating government has no
power to restrict expression because of content); Chervin, supra note 43, at 417 (stating
governmental standards for receipt of funds cannot be content or viewpoint based). But see
Kinsey v. Salado Independent School Dist., 950 F.2d 988, 992-96 (5th Cir. 1992) (denying
free speech violation in employment termination); cf. Regan v. Taxation with Representa-
tion of Wash., 461 U.S. 540, 550-51 (1983) (upholding regulations refusing tax deductions
for all non-profit organizations engaged in lobbying).
" See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1779 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
54 See Chervin, supra note 43, at 422. Funds cannot be conditioned upon content or
viewpoint of speech. Id. Content-based speech, which forbids discussion about prayer in
schools, is distinguishable from viewpoint-based speech, which forbids discussion that advo-
cates prayer in schools. Id. at 416 n.88.
" See Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). But see Reitler, supra note 48, at
457 (stating that federal regulation of speech through subsidies is not new approach).
" Rust, 111 S. Ct. at 1780 (citing League of Women Voters, 468 U.S. at 383-84, quoting
Consolidated Edison Co. v. Public Serv. Comm'n of N.Y., 447 U.S. 530, 546 (1980)); see
First Nat'l Bank of Boston v. Bellotti, 435 U.S. 765, 791 n.31 (1978). Government may not
become the final judge of the relative merits of conflicting arguments. Id.; Anthony J. Col-
letta, Abridgements of Free Speech Which Discriminate on the Basis of Viewpoint: Finzer v. Barry,
61 ST. JOHN's L. REv 127, 131-33 (1986) (addressing viewpoint discrimination against disa-
greeable but peaceful expressions); McCarthy, supra note 33, at 1197 (quoting Stone, Con-
tent Regulation and the First Amendment, 25 WM. & MARY L. REV. 189, 199 (1983)). "Govern-
ment attempts substantially to eliminate particular ideas, viewpoints, or items of
information from public debate . . . undermine the values and purposes underlying the
[F]irst [A]mendment." Id. But see Reitler, supra note 48, at 456-57 (concluding that Title X
is not an unconstitutional infringement on First Amendment rights).




method of family planning is explicitly viewpoint-based, since the
regulations restrain only pro-choice, not pro-life or anti-abortion
sentiment. Although the government cannot directly prohibit
abortions or control speech, the government has indirectly dis-
criminated against indigent women by denying them counseling
on abortion.58 As a result, Title X providers are indirectly
"gagged"5 and must waive their First Amendment rights as a
condition to the receipt of federal funds needed to keep their in-
stitutions operating."0
08 See S. REP. No. 1472, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. 1, reprinted in 1970 U.S.C.C.A.N. 5068, 5070
(indicating that Title X program targeted to low-income and indigent persons, and infor-
mation regarding pregnancy was to be made widely available); see also Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963) (indirect deterrence as effective as direct deterrence); Chervin,
supra note 43, at 424 (right to abortion free of governmental influence should be as viable
for indigent client as for one who pays).
"9 See Chervin, supra note 43, at 403-04, 410-14 (analyzing prohibition of abortion
speech).
60 See Rust, Ill S. Ct. at 1781-84 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (explaining how Title X
regulations violate First Amendment freedoms by withholding funds as penalty for discuss-
ing abortion); cf Reitler, supra note 48, at 495 (concluding that "Title X Regulations are
constitutional exercises of government speech by subsidy").
Michael Astrue, general counsel for the Department of HHS, said that " '[tihe clinics
have had several year's warning' " and if they will not follow the rules, then the money will
be offered to others who will. See Some Clinics, supra note 21. Considering that Title X
provided $144 million to projects this year, it is likely that many clinics will accept these
funds even under such restrictions. But see Clinics Vow, supra note 21. Yet, many are pledg-
ing to give up federal funding rather than submit. Id. Judith Desarno, "head of the Na-
tional Family Planning and Reproductive Health Association, which represents more than
90% of the clinics," stated that "[i]f in fact people can't find a way to do on-site counseling,
they will turn the money back . I..." d. Planned Parenthood of New York City is deter-
mined to return the $423,000 a year it receives under Title X, a 25% cut of its overall
budget, according to the group's president, Alexander Sanger. Id. Planned Parenthood in
New Hampshire, Vermont, Maine and Connecticut will follow suit. Id.
David Hass, president of the Board of Directors of Planned Parenthood of Wisconsin
also vows to forgo the $225,000 of its $11 million budget even though it will mean closing
clinics. Linda Feldmann, U.S. Abortion Clinics Await Policy Signal by Congress, CHRISTIAN SCI
MONITOR, June 18, 1991, (The U.S.), at 7 [hereinafter Abortion Clinics Await]. Jill June,
President of Planned Parenthood of Greater Iowa, said, "[wiomen and their rights and our
principles are not for sale, so we will do without the money rather than comply." Some
Clinics, supra note 21, at 5. The Iowa Planned Parenthood provides services to eighty-seven
rural counties in that state and receives $500,000 a year, 10% of its annual budget. Id. In
all, Planned Parenthood will forgo more .than $30 million a year in federal funds. Id. Di-
rectors of other federally financed clinics from Vermont to California similarly condemned
the ruling. Id. Dr. Allan Rosenfield, dean of Columbia University School of Public Health
and professor of public health and obstetrics stated that this was "an absolutely unaccept-
able intrusion into my practice of medicine .... I would be practicing malpractice. Patients
would have the right to sue." Id.
Some Title X projects have tried inventive strategies to deal with these restrictions: clin-
ics already functioning under the Title X regulations have managed to keep their subsidies
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As a result, indigent women and Title X providers who have
accepted and relied on the pre-1988 regulations and federal sup-
port for nearly two decades,6 would be substantially penalized by
the withdrawal of such funds, leaving them in a worse position
than if the subsidies had never been created."2
Although the Supreme Court has approved conditions on public
funding in the past,63 any attempt to condition funds which would
infringe upon a constitutional right such as free speech, must be
narrowly tailored to promote a specific public interest.64 No legiti-
while providing abortion services by having counselors whose salaries are not paid by Title
X make referrals. Abortion Clinics Await, supra, at 7. Thomas C. Kring, executive director
of the Los Angeles Regional and Family Planning Council and the California Family Plan-
ning Council, which together distribute $13.5 million in federal funds to 200 clinics, has
had the clinics continue their ordinary practice. Some Clinics, supra note 21, at 5. Kring's
noncompliance is due to the $36 million they receive from state family planning funds,
which is contingent upon providing counseling for all option as mandated by state law. Id.
It may require the Councils to separate state and federal funds or decline federal funds
altogether. Id. Assemblywoman Maureen Ogden (R-Union) hopes to intro*duce legislation
providing up to $3.9 million annually in state funding for clinics that lose Title X funds.
Proposed Legislation Would Aid New Jersey Family Planning Clinics, PROPRIETARY TO THE
UNITED PRESS INT'L 1991, May 29, 1991 (Regional News). Alexander Sanger, President and
CEO of Planned Parenthood of New York City, reported $85,000 in private donations as
of early June. Abortion Clinics Await, supra, at 7.
0" See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 73 n.1 1 (1st
Cir. 1990), vacated, 111 S. Ct. 2252 (1991) (Title X funds constituted approximately 50
percent of operational budget for most clinics).
0" See Seth F. Kreimer, Allocational Sanctions: The Problem of Negative Rights in a Positive
State, 132 U. PA. L. REV. 1293, 1359-62 (1984). Grantees who no longer receive federal
subsidies would be moved below a 'natural baseline,' the position enjoyed in the normal
course of events. Id. "Losing a benefit previously provided [differs] from simply never hav-
ing been provided the benefit in the first place." Id. at 1359.
'S See, e.g., Lyng v. International Union, UAW, 485 U.S. 360, 364-69 (1988) (provision
of Food Stamp Act denying benefits to members of union on strike does not violate First
Amendment); Grove City College v. Bell, 465 U.S. 555, 573-74 (1984) (conditioning of
federal funding of college upon compliance with Title IX regulation prohibiting sex-based
discrimination is constitutional); Oklahoma v. United States Civil Serv. Comm'n, 330 U.S.
127, 142-43 (1947) (restricting political activities of state employees who are paid through
federal grants); DKT Memorial Fund Ltd. v. Agency for Int'l Dev., 887 F.2d 275, 299
(D.C. Cir. 1989) (upholding government's right to deny aid to private groups supporting
abortion in foreign countries).
04 See Simon & Schuster, Inc. v. Members of the N.Y.S. Crime Victims Bd., 112 S. Ct.
501, 508 (1991) (reiterating that regulations on First Amendment freedom of speech must
be narrowly tailored to advance interest asserted by state); Arkansas Writers' Project, Inc.
v. Ragland, 481 U.S. 221, 231 (1987), overruled by Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759 (1991)
(state must narrowly draw statute and prove compelling state interest for content-based
taxation of magazines); Alexandra A.E. Shapiro, Title X, The Abortion Debate and the First
Amendment, 90 COL. L. REV. 1737, 1748 (1990) (asserting that conditions for funding must
be narrowly tailored to compelling public interest); cf David M. Schoeggl, New Life for the
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions?, 58 WASH. L. REV. 679, 697 (1983) (favoring Supreme
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mate public interest has-been advanced by the 1988 regulations,6"
and the effect of these regulations has been to impose an all-en-
compassing "gag rule" on a provider's ability to counsel pa-
tients. 68 It is therefore suggested that although the government
may have a compelling interest that would warrant prohibiting
abortion, it cannot justify prohibiting speech concerning abortion.
2. Restricted Information: Restricted Freedom of Choice
Roe v. Wade established a woman's right to be free from govern-
mental interference with her reproductive decision. 67 The pur-
pose and result of the 1988 regulations are to impair the intelli-
gence and independence of that decision.8  Governmental
programs are a vital source of information, especially for the indi-
gent women of this country.69 However, since 1988, Title X pro-
Court's equal protection analysis on funding abortions over California's use of unconstitu-
tional conditions doctrine).
'5 Secretary ofHHS, 899 F.2d at 68 (stating lack of evidence that regulations advance any
interest in public health).
66 See Chervin, supra note 43, at 401 (demonstrating how regulations suppress health
providers' speech); see also Gag Rule on Abortion is Eased: Planned Parenthood Calls New
Clinic Guidelines a Sham, CHI. TRIB., Mar. 21, 1992, at 2. In an effort to avoid infringing
upon doctor-patient dialogue, President Bush announced new guidelines for the 1988 reg-
ulations. Id. The guidelines allow physicians in Title X clinics to give abortion advice, even
in non-life-threatening situations. Id. Physicians may also refer women to abortion facilities,
provided such facilities offer a full range of family planning services. Id.; Philip J. Hilts,
White House Allows Some Advice at Public Clinics About Abortion, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 21, 1992, at
1. The guidelines may simply have been a product of political motivations. Id. One inter-
pretation suggested the Bush Administration tried to "straddle the issue by loosening the
restraints on . . . clinics while . . . assuring anti-abortion forces that it was still firmly in
their corner." Id.; Spencer Rich, Administration Partly Lifts Ban on Abortion Advice; Regula-
tions Allow Exception for Doctors, WASH. POST, Mar. 21, 1992, at Al. Nurses, social workers
and other clinic personnel are still prohibited from abortion counseling. Id. In practice,
such workers provide the vast majority of counseling to women coming into the clinics. Id.
67 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing Roe v. Wade and its protection
of woman's right to decide whether to terminate her pregnancy).
" See Rust v. Sullivan, Ill S. Ct. 1759, 1784 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice
Blackmun contended that the majority was allowing the government to interfere with a
very intimate and personal decision. Id. He believed that the suppression of abortion infor-
mation was a form of "restrictive ideological message unrelated to considerations of mater-
nal health" and designed to instill the belief that abortion was not a medical option. Id. at
1785; Chervin, supra note 43, at 425 (receiving incomplete information removes women's
voluntary choice concerning reproductive decision).
" See Chervin, supra note 43, at 427 (cautioning that government may not use power to
manipulate information intended for persons dependent upon that information); see also
Baby Boom America is Losing the Battle Against Teen-age Pregnancy, .BosToN GLOBE, Feb. 11,
1990 (discussing young women's reproductive options, obstacles thereto and importance of
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fessionals are required to respond to any abortion inquiry by stat-
ing that abortion is not an appropriate method of family
planning.70 It is suggested that by denying the right to receive
complete information, the Court permitted an encroachment
upon indigent womens' Fifth Amendment rights. The indigent
woman who relies on providers for advice and expects complete
information regarding the purpose of her visit,71 unknowingly re-
ceives a message controlled by the government.72 Relying on this
advice, it is-likely that many women will follow through with child-
birth, believing that no other legitimate option is available.
73
Suppression of First Amendment speech disadvantages women
by leading them to believe they have received complete counsel-
ing, when in fact they have not.74 The unavailability of complete
information frustrates the exercise of medically sound and consti-
tutionally protected reproductive choices.75 It is submitted that
accurate information as depicted in 1987 National Research Council report, RISKING THE
FUTURE: ADOLESCENT SEXUALITY, PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING).
70 See Grants for Family Planning Servs., 42 C.F.R. § 59.8 (b)(5) (1988), supra note 31
(prohibiting counseling of abortion as method of family planning).
71 See Planned Parenthood Ass'n Chicago Area v. Kempiners, 568 F. Supp. 1490, 1497
(N.D. 111. 1983). "It is blinking at reality to say that a woman's counselor, who of necessity
occupies a position of great trust and intimacy, discusses only childbirth and refuses to
provide any information on abortion, will not have a critical impact upon the woman's
decision whether to carry her pregnancy to term." Id.; see also Kendall, supra note 50, at
767 (pregnant women expect complete information). But see Hirt, supra note 10, at 1913
(First Amendment does not require government to provide balanced viewpoints on preg-
nancy options).
72 See Rust, 11I S. Ct. at 1785 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). Justice Blackmun suggested
that this prohibition of abortion information was "a restrictive ideological message" to
deceive women who would rely on a trusted physician's advice or to delay the exercise of
their optin long enough to preclude abortion as an alternative. Id.
" See id. Most rational women will follow the "perceived advice and carry their preg-
nancy to term, despite their needs to the contrary and despite the safety of the abortion
procedure . I..." d.
74 See Chervin, supra note 43, at 425. Under the new regulations, the clients are actually
worse off because they assume that this mandated, biased counseling is complete. Id. "Had
the client never walked into that clinic, her perception of her options might actually have
been less distorted." Id. Without the knowledge that she is receiving skewed information, a
woman is encountering a government obstacle to her voluntary reproductive decision. Id.
76 See Massachusetts v. Secretary of Health and Human Servs., 899 F.2d 53, 65 (1st Cir.
1990), vacated, Ill S. Ct. 2252 (1991). The court stated that the delay in obtaining infor-
mation may prevent a pregnant woman from complying with the Roe v. Wade trimester
framework, thus denying her access to abortion. Id. Also concerning the court was that any
delay in obtaining necessary information would increase the medical risks inherent in the
abortion procedure. Id. An affidavit of Dr. George Morley supplied information that the
regulations might endanger women by pushing back the time of abortion. Id. at 67 n.7. He
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the Court's affirmation of the regulations places obstacles in the
path of indigent women, for whom Title X was enacted. As recog-
nized in the Rust dissent, the government has eradicated freedom
of choice as effectively as if it had banned abortions altogether.7 6
Furthermore, the 1988 regulations continue to be inconsistent
with congressional intent regarding Title X. 77
It is proposed that Rust v. Sullivan, Maher v. Roe, and Harris v.
McRae signify an indirect assault on the right of abortion through
the withholding of government subsidies. A more direct assault on
the right of abortion was set forth in Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services,78 where the Supreme Court effectively granted the right
to regulate abortion to the states. 9
II. THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF STATE ANTI-ABORTION STATUTES
A. The Demise of Roe v. Wade: Webster v. Reproductive Health
Services
For sixteen years, Roe v. Wade signified a woman's right of abor-
tion, qualified by a trimester schedule, which guided states in the
regulation of abortion.8" It is asserted that the Webster Court com-
promised Roe v. Wade by upholding state abortion regulations that
noted that abortions performed later in pregnancy "caused approximately half of all abor-
tion related deaths between 1972 and 1981." Id.
" See Rust v. Sullivan, 111 S. Ct. 1759, 1785 (1991) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). "The
denial of this freedom is not a consequence of poverty but of the government's ill-inten-
tioned distortion of information it has chosen to provide." Id.
" See John Deardourff, John Sununu and the Abortion Gag Rule, WASH. POST, Nov. 6,
1991, at A25. Immediately following the Rust v. Sullivan decision, Republicans in Congress
attempted to overturn or block the 1988 regulations. Id. This struggle was led by Rhode
Island Senator John Chafee and Illinois Representative John Porter. Id. Both houses passed
bills to overturn the three year old gag rule. Id.; see also supra note 33 (recounting agency
and congressional approval of original policy of Title X); The Gag Rule, Gagged, N.Y. TIMEs,
Nov. 2, 1991, at 22. The President promised to veto these bills. Id. Senators who were
close to the President cautioned that there would be an ensuing battle. Deardourff, supra.
Inevitably, the President vetoed these bills. Helen Dewar et al., House Cuts Abortion Lan-
guage as It Approves Spending Bill, WASH. POST, Nov. 23, 1991, at AIO. Although both
houses had passed these bills by a wide margin, the House was unable to muster the two-
thirds majority necessary to override the veto. Governors Against the Gag Rule, WASH. POST,
Dec. 13, 1991, at A28.
" 492 U.S. 490 (1989).
, Id. at 499 (reviewing constitutionality of Missouri statute regulating abortions); see in-
fra notes 80-104 and accompanying text (describing Webster's effect on right of abortion).
80 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (discussing holding and rationale of Roe).
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ran counter to the Roe decision. In severing the trimester guide-
lines and relegating Roe's fundamental right of abortion to a lib-
erty interest,8" the Webster Court has left the right of abortion en-
tirely subject to state regulation and possible prohibition.82
In Webster, five state-employed health professionals and two
nonprofit organizations challenged the constitutionality of a Mis-
souri statute which regulated their performance of abortions. 83 In
addressing the statute's preamble,84 the Supreme Court rejected
the lower court's finding that Missouri's adoption of a theory that
life begins at conception, improperly justified its regulation of
abortions.85 Instead, the Court held that the language of the pre-
amble did not regulate abortion but merely made "a value judg-
ment favoring childbirth over abortion."8 "
The majority next reviewed the sections of the statute which
made it unlawful for public employees using public facilities to
perform or assist in abortions not necessary to save the life of the
"I Webster, 492 U.S. at 520. The Court accused Roe's trimester framework of being in-
consistent with and independent of the Constitution. Id. at 518. Further, the concept had
become a "web of legal rules that have become increasingly intricate, resembling a code of
regulations rather than a body of constitutional doctrine." Id. (footnote omitted). Thus,
the Court felt that states' interests were as compelling throughout pregnancy as they are
after viability. Id. at 519 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetricians and
Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 795 (1986) (White, J., dissenting)).
To view the change in opinion of the right of abortion from a fundamental right to a
liberty interest, compare Roe, 410 U.S. at 152-56 (stating fundamental right of privacy,
including right of abortion, deserved strict scrutiny analysis and could only be interfered
with when compelling state interest was great) with Webster, 492 U.S. at 520 (depicting
right of abortion as mere liberty interest protected by due process and regulation of that
right need only bear rational relationship to legitimate state objective).
82 See Webster, 492 U.S. at 537-38 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part, dissenting in part).
The dissent believed the decision "would return to the States virtually unfettered authority
to control the quintessentially intimate, personal, and life-directing decision whether to
carry a fetus to term." Id.
83 Id. at 501.
8 Id. at 504-05. The preamble states that " '[t]he life of each human being begins at
conception, and that [ulnborn children have protectable interests in life, health, and well-
being.' " Id. at 504 (quoting Mo. REV. STAT §§ 1.205.1(1), 1.205.1(2) (1986)). The statute
then mandates that state laws be read to "provide unborn children with 'all the rights,
privileges, and immunities available to other persons, citizens, and residents of this state,'
subject to the Constitution and this Court's precedents." Id. (quoting Mo. REV. STAT. §
1.205.2. (1990)).
85 Id. at.505-06. The Court noted that the court of appeals improperly relied on dictum
in Roe that " 'a state may not adopt one theory of when life begins to justify its regulation
of abortions.' " Id. at 505 (quoting Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, Inc., 462 U.S.
416, 444 (1983), citing Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159-62 (1973)).
" Id. at 506 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
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mother.8 7 The lower courts had reasoned that the preclusion of
abortions in public facilities does more than demonstrate a value
judgment favoring childbirth. 8 Such preclusion not only re-
stricted and, in some cases, foreclosed the availability of abortions
but posed potential delays and cost increases.89 The Webster Court
held that a state is free to implement a value judgment favoring
childbirth over abortion through the allocation of funds, as well as
through the allocation of hospitals and medical staff.9" The Court
reasoned that the states are not restricting access to abortion.91
Rather, it is a woman's indigency which creates the only barrier to
a nonfunded abortion. 92
The final section addressed by the Webster Court stipulated that
no physician could perform an abortion on a woman he finds to
be at least twenty weeks into her pregnancy, until he first deter-
mined whether the unborn child was viable. 93 In doing so, the
physician should make a necessary finding of the maturity of the
unborn child.94 Not only would these maturity tests increase the
cost of an abortion, but some of these tests would impose signifi-
cant health risks for both the pregnant woman and the fetus if
performed before twenty-eight to thirty weeks of gestation.95 To
avoid constitutional difficulties,9" the Court construed the statute
to mean that physicians were to perform maturity tests only if, in
their "reasonable professional judgment," such tests would be rel-
evant in determining viability and would not be dangerous to ei-
" Webster, 492 U.S. at 507. The lower court had argued that such a provision could also
persuade private hospitals to take a pro-life position and thus severely restrict a woman's
choice to have an abortion. Id. at 509.
11 Id. at 509 (citing Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1081 (8th
Cir. 1988)).
11 Id. (citing Webster, 851 F.2d at 1081).
I d. at 510 (quoting Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464, 474 (1977)).
I ld. at 509. The Court asserts that a woman's right to an abortion is only infringed
upon "to the extent that she chooses to use a physician affiliated with a public hospital." Id.
92 Id. (quoting Maher, 432 U.S. at 474).
" Id. at 513. In determining viability, tests and examinations are necessary to show the
unborn child's gestational age, weight, and lung maturity. Id. (quoting Mo. ANN. STAT. §
188.029 (Vernon 1986)).
" See id.
" See id. at 514 (citing Reproductive Health Servs. v. Webster, 851 F.2d 1071, 1075 n.5
(8th Cir. 1988)).
11 See id. (citation omitted). The Court followed the well-established rule that statutes
will be interpreted to avoid unconstitutional results. Id.
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ther mother or fetus.97 According to the Court, viability testing
was aimed at furthering "the State's interest in potential human
life rather than in maternal health." '98 However, Roe v. Wade had
permitted state regulation in. the second trimester of pregnancy
only if reasonably related to maternal health.99 Thus, Webster lim-
ited Roe's trimester framework and extended the state's interest
throughout pregnancy.' Moreover, the Court replaced the
broad fundamental protection afforded by Roe and replaced it
with the more narrow guarantee of a liberty interest which is pro-
tected solely by the Due Process Clause.'
In Roe v. Wade, the Supreme Court sought a balance between a
woman's fundamental right to do with her body as she wished and
the state's interest in maternal health, prenatal life and medical
standards. 2 It is submitted that Webster v. Reproductive Health Ser-
vices has upset this balance by allowing the state's interest in po-
tential life to override a woman's right of abortion.
B. Current State Anti-Abortion Statutes: In the Wake of Webster
The Webster majority realized its decision would invite govern-
mental regulation that would otherwise be prohibited by Roe and
its progeny.0 3 The Court's goal was to leave this politically and
emotionally charged issue to the state legislatures and their elec-
torates.'" Accordingly, several states have responded with harsh
97 Id. at 514-15.
0" Id. at 515.
9 see id. at 516; see supra note 4 (Roe held that regulation of abortions in second trimes-
ter by states must be reasonably related to maternal health).
100 Id. at 516-19. In reevaluating the Roe trimester system, the Court stated, "[Tihe rigid
Roe framework is hardly consistent with the notion of a Constitution cast in general terms,
as ours is, and usually speaking in general principles, as ours does." Id. at 518. Further, the
Court did not "see why the States' interest in protecting potential human life should come
into existence only at the point of viability, and that there should therefore be a rigid line
allowing state regulation after viability but prohibiting it before viability." Id. at 519.
101 Id. at 520; see supra note 3 and accompanying text (discussing fundamental right to
liberty interest).
102 See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 153-54 (1973).
10' See Webster, 492 U.S. at 520-21. The Court acknowledged that "[t]here is no doubt
that our holding today will allow some governmental regulation of abortion that would
have been prohibited." Id.; Crain and cases cited supra note 6 (describing scope of abortion
right derived from Roe and its progeny).
' See Webster, 492 U.S. at 521. The Court stated it is attempting to adhere to the Con-
stitution's balance between what is and is not encompassed by the democratic process. Id.
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anti-abortion laws. 10 5
1. Pennsylvania
In 1991, the Pennsylvania legislature amended its Abortion
Control Act of 1982106 to address issues of informed consent, 107
parental consent' and spousal notice. ° The United States Dis-
trict Court for the Eastern District of Pennsylvania reviewed the
constitutional validity of these provisions and held, inter alia, that
the compulsory 24-hour delay, required under the informed con-
sent provision, was unconstitutional.110 The court determined that
if a woman is willing to proceed with the abortion after appropri-
ate counseling, then a state may not require that she delay that
decision.1 The informed consent provision also mandated that
10' See Joyce Price, Pro-Lifers See Hope in State Hoppers, WASH. TIMES, Sept. 16, 1991, at
A5. Pro-lifers have had success in state legislatures since July, 1989, when the Supreme
Court afforded States more authority to regulate abortions. Id. The most strict anti-abor-
tion laws have been enacted in Pennsylvania, Louisiana, Utah and Guam. Id. North Da-
kota, Mississippi, Ohio and Michigan passed laws requiring informed consent, while Ne-
braska passed a bill requiring notification of one parent for an unmarried minor. Id.; cf
Susan Gilmore, Initiative 120: 'Insurance' Against End of Roe Ruling, SEATTLE TIMES, Oct.
15, 1991, at B 1. Against a flurry of pro-life legislation, several states have enacted mea-
sures protecting the basic right of abortion found in Roe v. Wade. Id. Washington state has
presented its voters with an initiative which would protect the right of abortion if Roe is
overturned by the Supreme Court. Id. The initiative would allow abortions until the time
of fetal viability without "extraordinary medical measures." Id. The state already funds
abortions for indigent women and thus has a reputation as being one of the most liberal
states on the abortion issue. Id. Within the last year, three other states have codified the
Roe decision. Id. In 1990, Connecticut became the first state to guarantee a woman's right
of abortion. Id. It added mandatory counseling for pregnant women 15 years old or
younger. Id. The state also funds abortions for indigent women but only by court order. Id.
Nevada allows abortions up to 24 weeks, after that point they are allowed only to save the
life of the mother. Id. In Maryland, where parent notification is generally required for
minors, the abortion rights bill passed by the legislature has been stalled by opponents and
will be voted on next year. Id.
As for state funding of abortion, nine states voluntarily pay with few restrictions, while
four states pay under court order. Id. When the 1988 Title X regulations were passed to
prohibit clinics from engaging in abortion speech, Washington state vowed to shift its
money to cover the federal segment. Id.
100 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. §§ 3201-3220 (1983 & Supp. 1991).
107 See id. § 3205.
100 See id. § 3206.
100 See id. § 3209.
11 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 744 F. Supp. 1323, 1378-79 (E.D.
Pa. 1990) (citing Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 450-51 (1983))
(basing decision on Akron precedent), rev'd in part, aff'd in part, 947 F.2d 682 (3d Cir.
1991), cert. granted, 60 U.S.L.W. 3498 Uan. 21, 1992).
"' Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1378 (quoting Akron, 462 U.S. at 450-51).
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certain information be provided to all women at least 24 hours
prior to obtaining an abortion."' Applying Supreme Court prece-
dent, the court invalidated the informed consent requirement,
stating that it represented "the dissemination of information that
is not relevant to such consent, and . . . advances no legitimate
state interest. 11 3 It is submitted that this targeted information is
an intrusive attempt by the government to discourage abortions
and promote childbirth.
The Pennsylvania statute also required the consent of one par-
ent or guardian of a pregnant unemancipated minor or incompe-
tent woman,"1  but judicial bypass of such consent was available.115
Precedent has established that states cannot give parents an abso-
lute veto,"' but may furnish them with notice or consent powers
if safeguarded by a judicial bypass procedure." ' However, the
court determined that the Pennsylvania requirement that parents
must not only consent, but first be fully informed, would force
1 See id. at 1380; see also 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3205 (Supp. 1991). The statute
requires that the physician inform the woman orally of:
(i) The nature of the proposed procedure or treatment and of those risks and alter-
natives to the procedure or treatment that a reasonable patient would consider ma-
terial to the decision of whether or not to undergo abortion.
(ii) The probable gestational age of the unborn child at the time the abortion is to
be performed.
(iii) The medical risks associated with carrying her child to term.
Id. Moreover, the statute requires that the woman be informed of materials which describe
the unborn child, organizations which offer alternatives to abortion, medical benefits the
woman nay be entitled to, and that the unborn child's father is liable for child support. Id.
13 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1381 (quoting Thornburgh v. American College of Obstetri-
cians and Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747, 762-63 (1986)) (citations and footnotes omitted); see
Akron v. Akron Ctr. for Reprod. Health, 462 U.S. 416, 444-45 (1983) (striking down de-
tailed fetal development and other informed consent requirements similar to
Pennsylvania's).
11 Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1382; see 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3206(a), (b) (1983 & Supp.
1991).
15 See id. at 1383. This option avoids the situation where a sufficiently mature woman,
who is a minor, is precluded from obtaining an abortion because of an "absolute veto" by
her parents. Id.; cf. 18 PA. CoNs. STAT. ANN. § 3206(c)-(f) (1983 & Supp. 1991).
"' Casey, 744 F. Supp. at 1382 (refusing to provide parents with absolute veto because of
potential for arbitrariness) (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428
U.S. 52, 74 (1976)).
"1 Id. at 1383. Precedent has held that a state may require the consent of a parent if it
also provides a judicial by-pass procedure. Id. The procedure entitles a minor to demon-
strate sufficient maturity or circumstances making an abortion in her best interests. Id.(citing Akron, 462 U.S. at 439-40, Ohio v. Akron Center for Reprod. Health, 110 S. Ct.
2972, 2972 (1990) and Hodgson v. Minnesota, 110 S. Ct. 2926, 2926 (1990)).
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more women to follow the judicial bypass procedure, unduly bur-
dening the woman's decision."'
The final section under review required a physician to obtain a
signed statement from a pregnant woman that her husband had
been notified." 9 Such general spousal consent requirements have
been invalidated by the Supreme Court.'2 The district court con-
cluded that this requirement did not serve a compelling state in-
terest in promoting marital integrity.'
On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Third
Circuit held that only the spousal notice requirement was uncon-
stitutional.'22 The court based its decision on an undue burden
test, even though the Supreme Court has never supported such a
test in the past. 23 It is suggested that, by disregarding established
precedent, the Third Circuit has granted the Pennsylvania legisla-
ture license to impede the exercise of a woman's right of abortion.
Such obstacles, however, may not be placed in the path of a wo-
man's constitutional freedom of choice. 24 Because of the impor-
tant constitutional issues raised, the Supreme Court announced
that it would review Pennsylvania's abortion regulations during
the 1992-93 term. 25
118 See id. at 1384.
Id. (citing 18 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 3209 (Supp. 1991)).
120 Id. at 1386-87 (noting Supreme Court's refusal to condition abortion decision on con-
sent of husband) (citing Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 67-
72 (1976)).
"I' Id. at 1387. The court reasoned that since many of today's marriages are not based
on "mutual communication, decision-making and respect," a spousal veto could serve to
further harm an already unstable marriage. Id. at 1388.
121 Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v, Casey, 947 F.2d 682, 713 (3d. Cir. 1991).
123 See id. at 697-98; see also Michael D. Hinds, Appeals Court Upholds Limits for Abortions,
N.Y. TIMF-s, Oct. 22, 1991, at Al, A16. The appellate court had based its reasoning on the
undue burden standard which it concluded was binding and "the law of the land." Id. at
A7. However, Justice O'Connor is the only member of the Supreme Court who has explic-
itly adopted such a standard. Id. Legal experts believe the Third Circuit's decision is a
prediction of how the Supreme Court will rule, and that a motivation of the Court was that
its decision not be overturned. Id.; see also Ruth Marcus, Most of Abortion Curb in Pennsylva-
nia Upheld; U.S. Appeals Panel Cites High Court Rulings, WASH. PosT, Oct. 22, 1991, at Al
(reporting court of appeal's reliance on undue burden standard which majority of Supreme
Court has not adopted).
124 See Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 316 (1980) (stating that government may not
burden woman's exercise of right of abortion but need not remove obstacles it has not
created).
" See Ruth Marcus, Justices to Rule on Pennsylvania Abortion Limits: Supreme Court's Tim-
ing Assures Focus on Issue in Fall Campaigns, WASH. POST, Jan. 22, 1922, at Al. The Pennsyl-
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2. The True Contenders to Roe v. Wade: Louisiana, Utah and
Guam
Although the Pennsylvania anti-abortion law does not directly
challenge Roe v. Wade, statutes in Louisiana, Utah and Guam di-
rectly confront the abortion right created in Roe.' 26
a. Louisiana
In the summer of 1991, the Louisiana state legislature over-
rode the Governor's veto and passed a bill which criminalized
abortion, except in situations of rape or incest or to save the life
of the mother. 2 7 A case challenging the new.law was heard in the
United States District Court for the Eastern District of Louisi-
ana.1 28 where the Louisiana statute was equated to the one de-
clared unconstitutional in Roe v. Wade.'29 Asserting that Roe was
still "the law of the land," the court held that the Louisiana stat-
ute was unconstitutional. 3 The district court judge cautioned
vania statute is "one of a spate of abortion statutes enacted in the wake of the high court's
1989 ruling in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, which gave states more leeway to
restrict abortion." Id. Arguments for Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey are
anticipated in April, 1992, with a final determination before the Court recesses in July. Id.;
see also Christine Spolar & Molly Sinclair, 70,000 March Against Abortion: Bush Encourages
Demonstrators on 19th Anniversary of Roe, WASH. POST, Jan. 23, 1992, at Al (reporting on
Bush's plea for alternatives to abortion before March of Life demonstrators just days after
Supreme Court announced decision to rule on Pennsylvania abortion statute).
"' See Tony Mauro, Upcoming Term to Offer Supreme Court Full Plate, N.J. L.J., Aug. 29,
1991, at 68 (predicting constitutional challenge to Roe v. Wade and characterizing Louisi-
ana as possibly toughest statute among state anti-abortion laws); see also Hinds, supra note
123, at A7. The Pennsylvania Attorney General, Ernest D. Preate, Jr., urged that the
Pennsylvania statute was a reasonable, "middle-of-the-road" control on abortion and not a
complete ban. Id. The statutes enacted by Louisiana, Utah and Guam are considered much
more restrictive than Pennsylvania's and criminalize most abortions. Id.; Marcus, supra
note 123, at Al (quoting National Right to Life Committee which encourages states to
enact abortion restrictions and which described Pennsylvania's statute as "extremely mod-
erate"); Price, supra, note 105 (describing stringent anti-abortion laws and depicting Loui-
siana's as "most significant" because it directly attacks Roe).
127 See LA- REV. STAT. ANN. §14:87 (West 1986 & Supp. 1991); Group: Abortion Law in La.
Toughest, NEW ORLEANS TIMES. Jan. 8, 1992, at A6 (ranking Louisiana's abortion statute as
most severe law in United States); see also A Record Veto, NEW ORLEANS TIMES, June 20,
1991, at B6 (memorializing this as first legislative override of Governor's veto in Louisi-
ana); Garry Boulard, U.S. Abortion Travail Small Step Closer to Resolution, CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Aug. 13, 1991, at 7 (describing legal and political battle over abortion in
Louisiana).
2 Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930 (E.D. La. 1991).




that a Supreme Court precedent could only be overruled by the
Supreme Court,' 31 and that lower courts must follow such prece-
dent "no matter how misguided the judges of those courts may
think it to be." 1 'a It is submitted that this analysis is the proper
approach when reviewing state attempts to restrict the right of
abortion, because the Supreme Court intended Roe to afford every
pregnant woman the security of a right of abortion regardless of
the state in which she resides. Instead of applying a standard that
the Supreme Court has not even adopted, it is further urged that
the Third Circuit should have relied upon Roe when reviewing the
Pennsylvania statute, thus preserving the right of abortion for
women nationwide as Roe intended.
b. Utah
Another of the nation's most stringent laws allows abortions to
save the life of the mother, to prevent grave damage to her
health, to prevent grave fetal deformity, or in reported cases of
rape and incest.' 33 The law is being challenged at the federal level
by the American Civil Liberties Union and the Planned
Parenthood Association as unconstitutionally vague.'1 4 The plain-
tiffs contend that the law is "too broad, violates free speech rights
and denies citizens their right to know what constitutes a crime
under the law." '1 35 Although the statute was amended to remove
severe criminal penalties, doctors still face a five year sentence and
Id. (citing Thurston Motor Lines, Inc. v. Jordan K. Rand, Ltd., 460 U.S. 533, 535
(1983)).
132 Id. (citing Hutto v. Davis, 454 U.S. 370, 375 (1981)).
"' UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-302 (1990 & Supp. 1991).
131 See Liberty v. Bangerter, No. 91-C-345G (C.D. Utah 1991); Federal Judge Refuses to
Delay Utah Abortion Suit, REUTERS, Sept. 10, 1991, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library,
REUTERS file [hereinafter Federal Judge] (reporting constitutional challenge to Utah abor-
tion law in federal court by American Civil Liberties Union and Utah Planned
Parenthood); Suit Filed Challenging Utah Abortion Law, NAT'L LJ., Apr. 22, 1991, at 6 [here-
inafter Suit Filed] (depicting American Civil Liberties Union and Planned Parenthood as
plaintiffs challenging constitutionality of Utah abortion statute in Bangerter).
i31 See Suit Filed, supra note 134, at 6 (depicting constitutional challenges as violations of
"right of privacy, equal protection, freedom of religion, due process, free speech and free-
dom from involuntary servitude"); Utah Abortion Law is Suspended, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 10,
1991, at A18 (recounting April filing of Liberty v. Bangerter where plaintiffs challenged
Utah abortion statute as broad, vague and violation of free speech).
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a $5,000 fine for performing illegal abortions."' 6 Enforcement of
this law has been suspended pending a final determination of the
case. 137
c. Guam
In the interest of protecting the unborn child from the moment
of conception, the Guam legislature, with the support of its gover-
nor, passed a bill in 1990 revising the territory's abortion stat-
utes.1 38 Consequently, abortions in Guam may be performed only
if the continued pregnancy would endanger the life of the mother
or would gravely impair her health.13 9 Both the physician and the
pregnant woman can be criminally sanctioned for any violation.140
Solicitation of abortions from women seeking these services or by
physicians advertising them is also criminalized.' The Guam So-
ciety of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, doctors, nurses and their
patients commenced suit against the Governor and others chal-
lenging the constitutionality of the statute.'42 The federal district
court addressed the issue of whether Roe v. Wade is controlling law
in the territory of Guam. 43 The district court answered affirma-
tively and permanently enjoined the defendants from enforcing
"' See Suit Filed, supra note 134, at 6 (reporting on criminal homicide charges under
Utah's new abortion statute); The New Fetal Police, NAT'L L.J, Aug. 26, 1991, at 13. Under
the original version of Utah's abortion statute, women could have faced the electric chair
or gas chamber and doctors could have been prosecuted for first degree murder. Id.; see
also Mimi Hall, Abortion Issue Can Produce Flaws in Laws, USA TODAY, Apr. 18, 1991, at 6A.
The Utah legislature removed provisions that could have subjected Utah women to the
death penalty. Id. However, they overlooked a provision that allows a charge of double
homicide against someone who might kill a pregnant woman. Id.; Abortion Law Change,
NEWSDAY, Apr. 19, 1991, at 16 (reporting amendment to.Utah's abortion statute eliminat-
ing murder charge); Federal Judge, supra note 134 (pointing to five year sentence and
$5000 fine against doctors performing illegal abortions even though criminal penalties
were removed).
"' See Suit Filed, supra note 134, at 6 (reporting that effective date of Utah anti-abortion
statute is stayed pending determination of suit brought by American Civil Liberties Union
and Planned Parenthood); Utah Abortion Law Suspended Pending Litigation, UNITED PRESS
INT'L, July 11, 1991 (discussing suspension of Utah's abortion law pending suit).
138 9 GUAM CODE ANN. §§ 31.20-.23 (1990).
'3' Id. § 31.20.
140 Id. §§ 31.21-.22.
141 Id. §§ 31.22-.23.
142 Guam Soc'y of Obstetricians and Gynecologists v. Ada, 776 F. Supp. 1422 (D. Guam
1990).
143 Id. at 1426.
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the unconstitutional statute.'" Not only did the statutory mandate
fail to account for the trimester framework of Roe, but the court
found that the ban on solicitation was violative of the First
Amendment's guarantee of free speech. 45
The Supreme Court in Webster v. Reproductive Health Services de-
nied that its decision would serve as an invitation to states to enact
abortion laws "reminiscent of the dark ages." 4" The aforemen-
tioned statutes contradict that denial and demonstrate the power
of pro-life constituents in the states. 47 It is submitted that pro-life
states determined to eradicate the right of abortion within their
boundaries will do so through austere regulations. It is further as-
serted that these severe regulations will continue to plague the Su-
preme Court as a result of its irreverent approach to Roe v. Wade.
144 Id.
14 Id. at 1429 n.9 (quoting Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 413 (1989)).
141 Webster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490, 521 (1989). The majority
faults the dissent for suggesting that its decision would redeliver the horrors of illegal and
unsafe abortions as they were before Roe v. Wade. Id. at 538, 557-58. The Court stated that
this result is not what it intended and that the mere suggestion insults congressional repre-
sentatives and their electorate. Id.
"I See supra notes 126-45 and accompanying text (describing harsh anti-abortion stat-
utes in Louisiana, Utah and Guam which prohibit abortions with few exceptions); TRIBE,
supra note 1, at 177-91. Professor Tribe explains that there is a strong political impetus
behind the abortion controversy which was fired by the Webster decision. Id. at 177-79. The
legislative bodies had become increasingly pro-life through single-issue voting. Id. at 178-
79. The pro-life camps were adamant about the fight, i.e., politicians who were not pro-life
would not get pro-life votes, while their pro-choice counterparts would not let the abortion
issue be the deciding factor in an election. Id. at 179. However, many pro-choice organiza-
tions formulated "a comprehensive strategy aimed primarily at state legislatures.- Id. at
178; Burt Solomon, Even for a President on a Roll, NAT'L J., July 20, 1991, vol. 23, no. 29,
at 1816 (depicting abortion as possible pivotal issue in next presidential election); Price,
supra note 105 (addressing pro-life successes in state legislatures and opposing pro-choice
strategy).
The effect abortion has on the federal government can be seen in a bill called the Free-
dom of Choice Act which was introduced in the Senate and reached the House floor.
TRIBE, supra note 1, at 191-92. The bill was designed to prohibit states from restricting
previability abortions or later abortions necessary to save the life or health of the mother.
Id. at 191; Price, supra note 105, at A l (depicting intense lobbying on Congress to broaden
or reduce abortion rights and pro-choice push for federal Freedom of Choice Act giving
national legal right of abortion and preventing state interference); cf Jonathan R. Macey,
Federal Deference to Local Regulators and the Economic Theory of Regulation: Toward a Public-
Choice Explanation of Federalism, 76 VA. L. REv. 265, 287-90 (1990). In the wake of Webster,
it is predicted that Congress will not preempt the abortion field. Id. at 287. Due to the
absolute nature of the abortion controversy, the area is better left to local legislatures. Id.
at 287-88. Congress will avoid entering this arena because of the serious political risks to its
members. Id. at 290. Thus, Congress will use the state legislatures as a political buffer and
shift the risk of error to local politicians. Id.
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III. SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAKING
The doctrine of stare decisis14 8 could arguably bind the Su-
preme Court to the enunciated rule of law in Roe v. Wade. 4 The
legitimacy of the Supreme Court as a legal institution rests on the
public's confidence in the neutrality and objectivity of its members
and the consistency of its decisions. 5 For sixteen years, the
American people, their elected representatives and the lower
courts have relied on the right of abortion. 5 Following a pure
stare decisis argument, it is submitted that the Supreme Court
should have sustained Roe v. Wade against the oppression of fund-
ing"' and state regulation cases."'
Although stare decisis has been characterized as binding and au-
thoritative, it must accommodate the inevitable growth of the
18 See WILLIAM 0. DOUGLAS, STARE DECISIs 7 (1949). Justice Douglas depicted stare deci-
sis as a strong recommendation to judges "to hold steadfast to ancient precedents lest the
courts themselves add fresh doubt, confusion, and concern over the strength of our institu-
tions." Id.; RUSSELL F. MOORE, STARE DECIsIS 4 (1958). Stare decisis is an English common
law principle whereby courts adhere to their precedents and apply them to future cases
that are factually similar. Id.; BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1406 (6th ed. 1990) (defining stare
decisis as abiding by or adhering to decided cases).
140 See supra notes 3-4 and accompanying text (holding and rationale of Roe v. Wade).
150 See J. CALVI & S. COLEMAN, AMERICAN LAW AND LEGAL SYSTEMS 30-31 (1989) (stability
and predictability are goals of stare decisis); JOEL B. GROSSMAN & RICHARD S. WELLS, CON-
STITUTIONAL LAW AND JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING 11 (3d ed. 1988) (stating that legitimacy is
gained from faithfulness to law and its enforcement); Edward D. Re, Stare Decisis, in EDUCA-
TION AND TRAINING SERIES 2 (1975). Stare decisis "preserve[s] continuity, manifest[s] re-
spect for the past, assure[s] equality of treatment for litigants similarly situated, spare[s]
judges the task of re-examining rules of law with each succeeding case, and afford[s] the
law a desirable measure of predictability." Id.; James C. Rehnquist, Note, The Power That
Shall Be Vested in a Precedent: Stare Decisis, the Constitution and the Supreme Court, 66 B.U. L.
REV. 345, 347 (1986) (asserting that "[tihe Anglo-American version of stare decisis pro-
motes important values of the rule of law: fairness, stability, predictability, and efficiency");
Christopher E. Smith, The Supreme Court in Transition: Assessing the Legitimacy of the Leading
Legal Institution, 79 Ky. L.J. 317, 322-26 (1990-91) (describing importance of legitimacy
and public perception of Court's role in decision-making). But see Christopher E. Smith,
Bright-Line Rules and the Supreme Court: The Tension Between Clarity in Legal Doctrine and
Justices' Policy Preferences, 16 OHIO N.U. L. REV. 119, 133-37 (1989) (providing cases where
justices have interposed personal policy preferences, thus disregarding stability and
predictability).
"' Compare Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (enunciating right of abortion) with Web-
ster v. Reproductive Health Servs., 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (detracting from that right).
52 See supra notes 10-77 and accompanying text (presenting state abortion funding cases
of Maher and Harris and federal abortion funding decision of Rust as assaults on right of
abortion).
M5 See supra notes 79-147 and accompanying text (depicting intrusive, even prohibitive,
nature of several state attempts at regulating abortion).
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law T'5 and yield to unfortunate error.' 5 Further, stare decisis has
less weight in constitutional cases 5" and the Court has overruled
its own constitutional precedents on more than one hundred and
thirty occasions in the past.' 7 These aspects of the doctrine, cou-
pled with the tremendous opposition to the Roe decision, lend
considerable support for Roe's abandonment.' Additionally, it is
15' See Re, supra note 150, at I (acknowledging seemingly incongruent nature of stare
decisis when law has changed).
'61 See Payne v. Tennessee, Il1 S. Ct. 2597, 2609 (1991) ("when governing decisions are
unworkable or are badly reasoned, 'this Court has never felt constrained to follow prece-
dent.' " (quoting Smith v. Allwright, 321 U.S. 649, 665 (1944)): MOORE, supra note 148, at
33-34 (1958). The Supreme Court will reject stare decisis if it believes it has erred even if
the rule of law has been followed for many years. Id.; Re, supra note 150, at 9-11. When
the law has been "misunderstood or misapplied," there should be reversal. Id. at 9 (citing
KENT. COMMENTARIES 475 (12th ed. 1896)); cf BENJAMIN CARDOZo, THE NATURE OF THE JU-
DICAI. PROCESS 12-13 (1921) (espousing theory that law is product of judicial predisposition,
created not discovered).
I'l See Webster, 492 U.S. at 518. The Supreme Court can make "needed changes" in
constitutional cases and has done so in the past. Id. (citations omitted); United States v.
Scott, 437 U.S. 82, 101 (1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 929 (1979). The Court recognized
that in federal constitutional cases the Court must defer to "the lessons of experience and
the force of better reasoning, recognizing that the process of trial and error, so fruitful in
the physical sciences, is appropriate also ine the judicial function." Id. (quoting Burnet v.
Coronado Oil & Gas Co., 285 U.S. 393, 406-08 (1932) (Brandeis, J., dissenting)); see also
Burnet, 285 U.S. at 406-08 (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (holding that although stare decisis is
commanding, constitutional matters are nearly impossible to correct through legislative ac-
tion and thus Supreme Court has often overruled earlier decisions); DOUGLAS, supra note
148, at 9 (affirming that in constitutional law, stare decisis is attenuated); Smith, supra note
149, at 337 (sserting that growing conservative majority shows little reluctance to reverse
constitutional case precedents, even where there are judicial decisions over many years so-
lidifying original precedent).
" See Michael P. Pfeifer, Abandoning Error: Self-Correction by the Supreme Court, in ABOR-
TION AND THE CONSTITUTION 5 (1987) (depicting fallibility of Supreme Court which is neces-
sarily and frequently correcting itself through reversals); see, e.g., Alstyne, supra note 3, at
1683 n.19. The Supreme Court upheaved longstanding case law when it overruled Plessy
v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) by Brown v. Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954). Id.
Plessy had been followed by thousands of decisions without question for over fifty years. Id.
Erie Railroad v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938) overruled the "century-old" diversity case
of Swift v. Tyson, 41 U.S. (16 Pet.) 1 (1842) on constitutional grounds. Id. More recently,
the Supreme Court overruled the constitutional holding of National League of Cities v.
Usery, 426 U.S. 833 (1976) by Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528
(1985). Id. See generally John P. Stevens, The Life Span of a Judge-Made Rule, 58 N.Y.U. L.
Rrv. 1 (1983) (discussing significance of stare decisis from judicial point of view).
"6' See generally ABORTION: FREEDOM OF CHOICE AND THE RIGHT TO LIFE 187-217 (Lauren
R. Sass ed., 1978) (outlining newspaper articles covering problematic results of right of
abortion with respect to debate of when life begins); TRIBE, supra note 1, at 16-21, 143-47,
161-96 (presenting tremendous response to Roe v. Wade which was primarily won by pro-
life activists); William B. Ball, Case Tactics and Court Strategies for Reversing Roe v. Wade, in
ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 185-93 (DennisJ. Horan et al. eds., 1987) (offering steps
to destroy "bizarre decision" of Roe v. Wade and thus accomplish "a total erasure of legal
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contended that the Court's lack of commitment to the principles
of Roe, as evidenced by the funding and regulation cases examined
above, demonstrates strong judicial disfavor toward continuing a
national right of abortion. Thus, it is suggested that Roe's demise
is inevitable, although it may occur through a less exacting
method than express overruling.
The Supreme Court has chosen the unobtrusive course of sub
silentio 59 overruling to return the right of abortion to the
states160 and to avoid the potential for social uproar. Repudiating
a precedent without expressly overruling it is the crux of the sub
silentio tactic.' 16 Its effect can be discerned by examining how the
access to abortion on demand"); John R. Connery, S.J., The Ancients and the Medievals on
Abortion: The Consensus the Court Ignored, in ABORTION AND THE CONSTITUTION 123-35 (Den-
nis J. Horan et al. eds., 1987) (describing Roe's treatment of history of abortion in western
world as "one of the most-garbled and error-laden parts of Roe v. Wade"); Roger H. David-
son, Procedures and Politics in Congress, in THE ABORTION DISPUTE AND THE AMERICAN SYS-
TEM 30-46 (Gilbert Y. Steiner ed. 1983) (recounting opposition to Roe and its relentless
-influence on Congress); Alstyne, supra note 3, 1677-88 (discrediting Roe by distinguishing
its right to destroy third-party life from any right protected by privacy); Ely, supra note 3,
at 935-36 (refuting rationale of Roe v. Wade even though admitting to being pro-choice);
William J. Wagner, Book Review, 35 CATH. U. L. REV. 335, 335-36, 350-52 (1985) (review-
ing GUIDO CALABRESI, IDEALS, BELIEFS, ATTITUDES, AND THE LAW (1985)) (discussing how indi-
vidual morality has largely influenced legal value judgments and concluding that Roe v.
Wade was disastrous).
"' See Sojourner v. Roemer, 772 F. Supp. 930, 932 n.2 (E.D. La. 1991) (citing BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 1428 (6th ed. 1990)) (defining sub silentio as under silence, without any
notice being taken).
160 See James Bopp, Jr. et al., Does the United States Supreme Court Have a Constitutional
Duty to Expressly Reconsider and Overrule Roe v. Wade?, 1 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 55, 57
(1990) [hereinafter Constitutional Duty]. Some commentators believe that the Supreme
Court has approached the Roe decision from a sub silentio standpoint. Id. "[A] majority of
the Court has now abandoned the foundation of abortion jurisprudence enunciated in Roe
v. Wade . . . .By doing so, the Court has sub silentio overruled Roe." Id. at 77 (footnote
omitted); James Bopp, Jr. & Richard E. Coleson, Webster and the Future of Substantive Due
Process, 28 DUQ. L. REV. 271 (1990). "Because of the lack of majority support for several
key elements of Roe, the case is defacto overruled .... The elements of Roe which are sub
silentio overruled go to the heart of the current abortion constitutional analysis." Id. at
277. The trimester framework and fundamental protection surrounding the right of abor-
tion have been eliminated. Id. at 277-78. The undue burden standard is now the "de facto
threshold standard of review" for abortion regulations. Id. at 278. Finally, substantive due
process analysis has been "de facto modified" in abortion cases so that a state no longer
needs to enact statutes "narrowly tailored" to the objectives of its compelling interest. Id.
But see Webster, 492 U.S. at 532-37 (Scalia, J., concurring). Scalia, in his concurrence, labels
the Court's acts as an avoidance of the issue, which he believes is different and far worse
than sub silentio overruling. Id.
161 See J.M. Balkin, Constitutional Interpretation and the Problem of History, 63 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 911, 947 (1988) (reviewing RAOUL BERGER, FEDERALISM: THE FOUNDERS' DESIGN (1987))
(quoting Raoul Berger, A Study of Youthful Omniscience: Gerald Lynch on Judicial Review, 36
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funding and regulation decisions detract from the tenets of Roe v.
Wade.'62 Although sub silentio overruling is a common practice in
our system of jurisprudence,' 63 it often clouds the law and under-
mines the legitimacy of both the new decision and the prece-
dent. 16 4 Stability is better achieved when the Court directly re-
views the weaknesses of the prior case law and completely, rather
than partially, overrules it."'5 By giving credibility to both the
funding and regulation cases in addition to Roe v. Wade, it is sub-
mitted that this sub silentio overruling has encouraged lower
courts to diverge and adopt a rule of law in accord with its policy
preferences, yielding the right of abortion to the whims of the
state legislatures and courts. It is suggested that the Supreme
Court has accepted these dangers and will continue to employ the
sub silentio tactic until Roe is completely dismantled or until the
Court is able to overrule the decision without recalcitrant
opposition.
CONCLUSION
Supreme Court decision-making from Maher v. Roe to the re-
cent case of Rust v. Sullivan illustrates the Court's intention to
render Roe v. Wade a paper tiger. The sub silentio elimination of a
ARK. L. REV. 215 (1982)) ("In the history of the Court many a decision has been overruled
sub silentio .... ").
'"" See Constitutional Duty, supra note 160, at 75 (citing CONGRESSIONAL RESEARCH SERVICE
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, ANALYSIS AND INTERPRETATION 2117 & Supp.
1988) (explaining that overrulings are not always express and many times must be deduced
from principles of related cases).
' See Pennhurst State School and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 127 (1984) (Ste-
vens, J., dissenting) (claiming at least 28 sub silentio repudiations by Supreme Court in last
century); Constitutional Duty, supra note 160, at 75 (citation omitted) (proposing that sub
silentio reversals are commonplace in Supreme Court decision-making); see, e.g., Stone v.
Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 519 n. 14 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) (stating that Court in Stone
achieves its decision without expressly overruling "diametrically contrary precedents").
"' See Bopp & Coleson, supra note 160, at 272. With a sub silentio overruling, courts
and legislatures will be uncertain as to the state.of abortion law. Id.; Constitutional Duty,
supra note 160, at 75. In recent abortion cases, the.Supreme Court "skirted its obligation
to say what the law is." Id. Varying interpretations of these decisions demonstrate the ex-
tent of resulting confusion and thus "legislatures will be hard pressed to ascertain the con-
stitutional limits 'on their discretion to act." Id.; see also Joan Stumpf, Comment, A New
Standard for Ineffective Assistance of Counsel Claims-Commonwealth v. Pierce, 61 TEMP. L.
REV. 515, 534-35 (1988) (claiming that sub silentio overruling obscures existing caselaw and
impacts precedential value).
'' See Stumpf, supra note 164, at 534-35 (asserting that overruling should occur by di-
rectly addressing faulty area of law and completely and expressly overturning it).
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national right of abortion leaves that right to the designs of state
legislatures, a majority of which are pro-life. Under this approach,
the Supreme Court has ceded a woman's reproductive right to the
dictates of her state's political polarization. As Justice Blackmun
stated in his dissenting opinion in Webster, "I fear for the future. I
fear for the liberty and equality of the millions of women who
have lived and come of age ...since Roe was decided. I fear for
the integrity of, and public esteem for, this Court." ' 6
Lisa J. Allegrucci & Paul E. Kunz
Webster, 492 U.S. 490, 538 (1989) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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